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ARTICLES 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
John Paul Jones *  
Molly T. Geissenhainer ** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This article selects from developments since May of 2007 in the 
law of Virginia pertaining to the work of administrative agencies 
state and local, as well as access to their meetings and informa-
tion in their custody. Elsewhere in this issue of the Annual Sur-
vey can be found reports of developments in the laws these agen-
cies are bound to carry out. 
II.  AMENDMENTS TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS ACT 
In 1984, the Virginia General Assembly was persuaded to es-
tablish a government gazette, the Virginia Register of Regula-
tions (the “Register”), and to oblige state agencies to publish 
therein notices of public meetings, announcements that a new 
regulation was in the works, its initial and final drafts, and ra-
tionales both for taking up such a project and for the final version 
in which it would be promulgated.1 The Register was supposed to 
 
*   Professor of Law, University of Richmond. LL.M., 1982, Yale University; J.D., 
1980, University of San Diego; B.A., 1969, Marquette University. The authors wish to 
thank Gail Zwirner and Suzanne Corriell for their generous and expert assistance in the 
preparation of this article. 
**   J.D. Candidate, Class of 2009, University of Richmond School of Law. 
 1. Act of Feb. 29, 1984, ch. 5, 1984 Va. Acts 6 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 2.2-4031 (Repl. Vol. 2008)); see John Paul Jones, Legislative Changes to Virginia Admin-
istrative Rulemaking, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 107, 109–12 (1984). Eventually, a code of admin-
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facilitate public participation in the making of laws and policies 
by the administrative agencies of the commonwealth. It probably 
has. It certainly has facilitated the work of paralegals. In 2007, 
the General Assembly amended the Administrative Process Act 
(“APA”), obliging agencies to publish what they had previously 
been printing in the Register on the Internet as well, at the Vir-
ginia Regulatory Town Hall.2 The intent behind this initiative 
was to facilitate public participation in governing by agencies, 
and it probably will, too. 
In 2008, the General Assembly returned to the subject of public 
participation in agency rulemaking. In 1984, the General Assem-
bly had commanded state agencies to develop (and publish in the 
Register) guidelines for members of the public who might be in-
terested in participating in the discussion leading up to the 
promulgation of a regulation.3 It was left to the discretion of each 
agency to decide what those guidelines might be, which meant to 
many agencies that each was left discretion to decide when and 
how to plagiarize guidelines published by another agency faster 
off the mark. A colorful chapter in Virginia’s history of public par-
ticipation, guidelines promulgation has now been brought to a 
close in favor of greater efficiency; however, the season for a hun-
dred flowers to bloom has passed.4 The Department of Planning 
and Budget (“DPB”) had until July 1, 2008, to produce “model” 
guidelines, and agencies have until the end of the year either to 
promulgate as their guidelines the DPB model or to adapt that 
model.5 An agency must have in place one or the other in order to 
make or amend a rule after the first of the year.6 
 
istrative regulations followed. Act of Mar. 6, 1992, ch. 216, 1992 Va. Acts 278 (codified as 
amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4103 (Repl. Vol. 2008)). 
 2. Act of Apr. 4, 2007, ch. 873, 2007 Va. Acts 2357 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-
4007.01 to -.07 (Cum. Supp. 2007)); see Virginia Regulatory Townhall Home Page, http:// 
www.townhall.state.va.us (last visited Oct. 16, 2008). 
 3. Act of Feb. 28, 1985, ch. 67, 1985 Va. Acts 78 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 2.2-4007.01 to -.3 (Repl. Vol. 2008)); see Jones, supra note 1, at 110–12. For an 
example of these guidelines, see 4 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 25-10-10 to -80 (2005). 
 4. See Mao Tse-tung, Speech at Peking (Feb. 27, 1957), in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR 
QUOTATIONS 826 (Emily Morison Beck ed., 15th ed. 1980).  
 5. See Act of Mar. 4, 2008, ch. 321, 2008 Va. Acts ___.   
 6. Id. 
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III.  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN RECENT CASES 
A.  Application Version 1.1 and Something in Denmark 
The story behind Loudoun Hospital Center v. Stroube began in 
2002, when Northern Virginia Community Hospital (“NVCH”), 
seeking to replace its hospitals in Arlington County and Fairfax 
County with one new facility, applied for a certificate of public 
need (“COPN”) to construct the new one but was denied by the 
Virginia Health Commissioner (the “Commissioner”).7 Thereaf-
ter, NVCH reapplied, while the Commissioner was considering 
COPN applications from Loudoun Hospital Center (“LHC”) and 
Inova Health Care Services (“Inova”).8 Eventually, the Commis-
sioner awarded COPNs to NVCH and Inova but refused LHC.9  
LHC appealed to the circuit court, arguing, among other 
things, that collateral estoppel barred the Commissioner from 
considering NVCH’s competing application because the issues it 
raised were the same as those that had been disposed of by the 
Commissioner’s decision on NVCH’s earlier application.10 In the 
circuit court, Judge Markow disagreed; but, “troubled” by evi-
dence of ex parte contacts between the Commissioner and possible 
interested parties prior to the closing of the agency record, he set 
aside the Commissioner’s decisions on all three applications and 
remanded the case to the Commissioner.11  
The Commissioner then filed in the record for a new hearing 
evidence of the prior ex parte contacts—an e-mail to the Commis-
sioner, letters from legislators, the description of a lunch between 
a member of the Governor’s staff and the Commissioner, and an 
e-mail between the hearing officer and another agency’s direc-
tor.12 
After that hearing, the Commissioner affirmed his initial rul-
ings, declaring that he had not been influenced by the ex parte 
 
 7. Loudoun Hosp. Ctr. v. Stroube, 50 Va. App. 478, 487, 650 S.E.2d 879, 884 (Ct. 
App. 2007). The following account is based on the opinion of the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. at 488, 650 S.E.2d at 884. 
 10. See id. 
 11. Id. at 488–89, 650 S.E.2d at 884–85. 
 12. See id. at 497–503, 650 S.E.2d at 889–92. 
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contacts.13 LHC again appealed to the circuit court, but Judge 
Markow remained convinced that collateral estoppel did not limit 
the Commissioner’s review of NVCH’s second application, and he 
could not be persuaded that the ex parte contacts improperly in-
fluenced the Commissioner’s decisions.14  
LHC then took its case to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, 
which affirmed the circuit court’s decision.15 Writing for Judges 
Frank and Humphreys, Senior Judge Coleman concluded that, 
when presented with a claim of issue preclusion as applied to an 
administrative adjudication, a reviewing court could consider de 
novo the question of law, but was generally bound by the agency’s 
findings of fact.16 In this case, a departmental hearing officer had 
made a finding of fact that the second application by NVCH dif-
fered from the first in several material respects, and the Commis-
sioner had adopted that finding.17 Supported by substantial evi-
dence, it could not be disregarded, and it drew the court of 
appeals to conclude that the two applications presented factual 
issues sufficiently different to foreclose collateral estoppel.18 
This is sound reasoning, generally applicable. But notice that 
here it is applied to an adjudicative process for screening applica-
tions, and consider the broader implications of the contrary posi-
tion advanced by LHC. If in such situations collateral estoppel 
operated as LHC had suggested, any applicant for a license would 
be allowed but one chance at a gold ring; that is, an applicant  
would be allowed to apply only once.19 As a result, enterprise 
would suffocate. The public interest is far better served by the de-
cision here that when an agency screener rejects an application, 
it can be an invitation to revise and submit version 1.1—or 2.0.20 
Antecedent to the question of whether the second application 
raised issues sufficiently different to rule out collateral estoppel 
is the question of whether the Commissioner, or for that matter, 
 
 13. Id. at 489, 650 S.E.2d at 885. 
 14. Id. at 489–90, 650 S.E.2d at 885. 
 15. Id. at 487, 650 S.E.2d at 884. 
 16. Id. at 493, 650 S.E.2d at 887. 
 17. Id. at 494, 650 S.E.2d at 887. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 494–95, 650 S.E.2d at 887–88. 
 20. This assumes there is a good reason for the rejection. Umstattd v. Centex Homes, 
G.P., 274 Va. 541, 650 S.E.2d 527 (2007), invites consideration of the risk of arbitrary re-
jection by screening authorities. See infra Part III.C.1. 
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any agency subject to the APA, has authority to dispose of a con-
tested issue by resorting to collateral estoppel. How exactly did 
collateral estoppel become part of the law of the Department of 
Health? The APA is rather specific about the factual basis for a 
decision made in circumstances such as these—that is, after an 
informal hearing—but it says nothing about what law applies.21 
The basic law, that which establishes the Department of Health 
and the office of Health Commissioner, both empowers the Board 
of Health to make regulations and applies the APA to that 
process.22 Without a properly promulgated regulation adopting 
collateral estoppel as the law of the Department of Health, how 
can the Commissioner embrace it? One answer might be that the 
common law of Virginia includes a common law of administrative 
procedure.23 This case could be treated as circumstantial evi-
dence of this fact precisely because the court of appeals proceeded 
so promptly to the corollary of whether the conditions for colla-
teral estoppel existed. 
But a contrary answer can be drawn from the APA’s provision 
for judicial review.24 If a reviewing court cannot find “an error of 
law as defined in § 2.2-4027,” it must dismiss the appeal.25 That 
seems to make the APA’s list of reversible errors of law exclusive 
rather than representative, and there is no room in that list for 
erroneous rejection on the grounds of collateral estoppel. That ei-
ther means the Commissioner could not in the first place rely on 
collateral estoppel for his rejection of the second petition, or else 
that the APA forestalls courts from correcting agencies when they 
misapply that bar in refusing that to which the applicant other-
wise may have a right. Imagining what the legislator who passed 
the APA would have said, the former seems a better choice. A lit-
tle prophylaxis can go a long way, so agencies with a yen for the 
utility of collateral estoppel might well consider drafting a notice 
of intended rulemaking. 
How the courts in this case treated the ex parte communica-
tions is more disturbing, but hard to fault in light of the sorry 
 
 21. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4019 (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
 22. See id. §§ 32.1-12, -24 (Repl. Vol. 2004). 
 23. No such assumption ought to be made about a pocket (post-Erie) of federal admin-
istrative law. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.  Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 
U.S. 519, 524–25 (1978). 
 24. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4027 (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
 25. Id. § 2.2-4029 (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
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state of Virginia law. Both found that, after remand and the fresh 
hearing that followed, and in light of the formal denial by the 
Commissioner, LHC could not sustain its burden of proving by 
clear evidence that the ex parte contacts improperly influenced 
the decisions.26 The court of appeals was satisfied, as Judge 
Coleman put it so intellectually, that the contacts did not intrude 
on “the calculus of consideration” of the decisionmakers.27 
It is really no excuse that the contacts came not with rival ap-
plicants but state legislators and executive officers;28 the law that 
restricts construction of health facilities is clear about who plays 
what role in the process and on the exclusive basis for such deci-
sions.29 In Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization v. 
Federal Labor Relations Authority, fortified by the clear language 
of the federal Administrative Procedure Act,30 a three-judge pan-
el assessed and condemned ex parte contacts by private and pub-
lic strangers in a case in which it was to be determined whether 
the union had lost its exclusive right to represent the controllers 
by encouraging an unlawful strike.31 In this case, when the appli-
cation is to be assessed with reference to a record, ex parte input 
should be promptly made a part of that record in order that in-
terested parties may comment.32 That happened here, but only 
after remand.33 It would not hurt to prohibit ex parte input so 
that outsiders are on notice and so that agency employees have 
both a duty and an excuse. Of course, convincing lawmakers to 
impose, by law, restrictions on their power to influence the deci-
sions of the agencies to which they have been assigned is no mean 
feat. 
 
 26. See Loudoun Hosp. Ctr. v. Stroube, 50 Va. App. 478, 495–503, 650 S.E.2d 879, 
888–92 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 27. Id. at 500, 650 S.E.2d at 890 (quoting Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Eng’rs, 714 F.2d 163, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). 
 28. “An administrative adjudication is ‘invalid if based in whole or in part on [legisla-
tive] pressures.’” Id. (quoting D.C. Fed’n of Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d at 1231, 1246 
(D.C. Cir. 1971)) (alteration in original). 
 29. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.3 (Cum. Supp. 2008). 
 30. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (2006). 
 31. 685 F.2d 547, 550–51 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Portland Audubon Society v. En-
dangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1542–43 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 32. See Prof’l Air Traffic Controller’s Org., 685 F.2d at 561–62. 
 33. Id. at 557. 
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B. Counter-Intuitive Interpretations 
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, 
“it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.” 
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so 
many different things.” 
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—
that’s all.” 
—Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass34 
Put another way, “[b]ecause the . . . test is a creature of the 
Secretary’s own regulations, his interpretation of it is, under our 
jurisprudence, controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsis-
tent with the regulation.’”35 In two recent decisions by the Court 
of Appeals of Virginia, this rule of law was applied in support of 
interpretations that were anything but expressions of plain 
meaning. 
The case of Elbow Farm, Inc. v. Paylor arose after the owner of 
a quarry that had been converted into a landfill applied to the 
Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (“DEQ”) for a va-
riance of groundwater monitoring requirements.36 When DEQ re-
fused, the applicant complained to the Chesapeake Circuit Court 
that the Director of DEQ (the “Director”) had erred in, among 
other things, his predicate decision that the ground water at the 
quarry still formed part of an aquifer serving Hampton Roads.37 
In the view of the Director, when the solid waste regulations de-
scribe an aquifer as yielding substantial quantities of water to 
wells and springs, they mean a quantity of water sufficient for 
sampling.38 Because samples could be collected, the Director ar-
 
 34. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 171 (Shocken Books 1979) (1872). 
 35. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley 
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)). 
 36. Elbow Farm, Inc. v. Paylor, No. 1611-06-1, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 48, at *4–6 (Ct. 
App. 2007) (unpublished decision). 
 37. See id. at *2. 
 38. See id. at *11–13. “‘Aquifer’ is defined in the Solid Waste Management Regula-
tions as ‘a geologic formation, group of formations, or a portion of a formation capable of 
yielding significant quantities of ground water to wells or springs.’” Id. at *11–12 (quoting 
9 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-80-10 (2004)).  
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gued the ground water at the landfill was significant enough for 
the aquifer monitoring requirements to apply.39  
The circuit court sided with the Director, and the court of ap-
peals affirmed unanimously.40 In an opinion joined by Judges 
Frank and Petty, but apparently with no precedential value or 
significance intended,41 Senior Judge Willis wrote that the Direc-
tor’s application in a particular case of a term defined in his de-
partment’s regulation deserves great deference from a reviewing 
court.42 Duly noted, but let us look more closely at the compound 
rule taken from Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission 
v. York Street Inn, Inc.: Words in a regulation must be construed 
to support the purpose of the basic law and the agency’s interpre-
tation is entitled to deference.43 The former may be viewed as a 
limit to the latter.44  
In York Street Inn, the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control  
Commission (“ABC”) had concluded that a platform on which five 
backgammon boards were inlaid was not a counter on which al-
cohol could be served under its regulation; the Supreme Court of 
Virginia agreed.45 Such an interpretation probably serves the 
purpose of the ABC law from which the regulation derives and 
therefore deserves deference.  
In Elbow Farm, if it mattered whether what was left of the 
aquifer at the landfill still fed the greater Columbia aquifer sup-
plying the Hampton Roads area, the court is silent on the issue. 
The court’s deference here is less on the basis of utility and more 
 
 39. See id. at *13. 
 40. Id. at *16. 
 41. Pursuant to Virginia Code section 17.1-413, the Elbow Farm opinion was not des-
ignated for publication. See id. at *1; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-413 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & 
Cum. Supp. 2008); Friedberg v. Hague Park Apartments, 61 Va. Cir. 589, 592 (Cir. Ct. 
2001) (Norfolk City) (noting that unpublished court of appeals documents have no prece-
dential value). 
 42. Elbow Farm, Inc., 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 48, at *13 (citing Va. Alcoholic Beverage 
Control Comm’n v. York St. Inn, Inc., 220 Va. 310, 315, 257 S.E.2d 851, 855 (1979)). 
 43. See Va. Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm’n v. York St. Inn, Inc., 220 Va. 310, 315, 
257 S.E.2d 851, 855 (1979). 
 44. We may, for the sake of convenience, choose to describe as deference the judicial 
embrace of an agency’s interpretation (of its own regulation or of the basic law from which 
that regulation follows) that the court finds supportive of the purpose of the basic law. But 
that embrace comes from critical assessment, not instead of it. Strictly speaking, when a 
court defers in this context, it declines to substitute its judgment out of respect for the 
agency decider on one basis (e.g., expertise) or another (separation of powers). 
 45. See York St. Inn, Inc., 220 Va. at 311–13, 257 S.E.2d at 852–53. 
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on the basis of office. The court in Elbow Farm also quotes Beck v. 
Shelton: “In construing statutory language that ‘is plain and un-
ambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of that statutory 
language.’”46 Just how plain is it anyway that, so long as a sam-
ple can be taken, groundwater is an aquifer? 
The case of Shippers’ Choice of Virginia, Inc. v. Smith arose af-
ter agents of the Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) discov-
ered Bobby Garrison in a classroom at the commercial driving 
school operated by Shippers’ Choice, apparently teaching without 
the teaching license required by law.47 According to the record, he 
“was employed and compensated [by Shippers’ Choice] as a me-
chanic.”48 After an administrative hearing, the DMV fined Ship-
pers’ Choice five hundred dollars and suspended its school license 
for thirty days.49 The school appealed, but the Circuit Court for 
the City of Richmond affirmed the administrative judgment that 
Shippers’ Choice had violated a DMV regulation.50  
The Court of Appeals of Virginia, after concluding that the 
DMV had ignored the plain language of both the statute and the 
regulation, sided with the school and reversed.51 Writing for 
Chief Judge Felton and Judge Clements, Judge Beales concluded 
that only instructors had to have teaching licenses and Garrison 
could not have been an instructor because he was not compen-
sated for teaching the class.52 The school therefore could not be in 
violation.53  
Given what the agents reported observing and the school did 
not contest, one might well ask why someone speaking to stu-
dents in a classroom session is not an instructor. As Judge Beales 
explained, the relevant statute defines an instructor as “any per-
son, whether acting for himself as operator of a driver training 
school or for such school for compensation, who teaches, conducts 
classes, gives demonstrations, or supervises persons learning to 
 
 46. Elbow Farm, Inc., 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 48, at *13 (quoting Beck v. Shelton, 267 
Va. 482, 488, 593 S.E.2d 195, 198 (2004)) (emphasis added). 
 47. See Shippers’ Choice of Va., Inc. v. Smith, 52 Va. App. 34, 36–37, 660 S.E.2d 695, 
696 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 48. Id. at 36, 660 S.E.2d at 696. 
 49. Id. at 37, 660 S.E.2d at 696. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 39–40, 660 S.E.2d at 697–98. 
 52. Id. at 39, 660 S.E.2d at 697. 
 53. Id. at 39–40, 660 S.E.2d at 697. 
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operate or drive a motor vehicle”; the DMV regulation incorpo-
rates that definition.54 The court saw the qualification “for com-
pensation” and concluded that, because Garrison was compen-
sated by Shipper’s Choice as a mechanic, he must have been 
teaching for free and therefore not unlawfully for want of a li-
cense.55 In the view of the court, there was no room for interpre-
tation because the language was clear.56 Nothing was said about 
how this interpretation might comport with the purpose of the 
basic law. Those who envision a cadre of truckers prepared for 
our highways by some sorcerer’s apprentice57 should not relax; 
although the regulation has been tightened in some aspects, the 
definition of “instructor” remains unchanged.58 
C.  Looking for Judicial Review in All the Wrong Places 
In three cases, two of them arising from local government ac-
tion on development applications and the third resulting in a 
judge’s removal from office, the Supreme Court of Virginia fur-
ther developed the law pertaining to judicial review of case deci-
sions by administrative agencies. 
1.   If Not a Writ of Mandamus, Why Not a Declaratory 
Judgment? 
In Umstattd v. Centex Homes, G.P., the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia reminded us of the verities that a writ of mandamus is not a 
remedy of right, but is issued in the court’s discretion only when 
no other remedy will do, and then only to compel the performance 
of ministerial duties that do not involve discretion.59 In this case, 
Centex, a land developer, applied to the Town of Leesburg for 
 
 54. Id. at 38, 660 S.E.2d at 697 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1700 (Repl. Vol. 2005)) 
(emphasis added); 24 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-121-10 (Cum. Supp. 2008). 
 55. See Shippers’ Choice of Va., Inc., 52 Va. App. at 39–40, 660 S.E.2d at 697. 
 56. See id. at 39, 660 S.E.2d at 697. 
 57. Note that the school saw fit to appeal twice a small fine and a brief suspension. 
See id. at 37, 660 S.E.2d at 696. What vision of the future might encourage such expensive 
resistance? See SORCERER (Paramount Pictures 1977) (ill-trained but desperate drivers 
fail at carting truckloads of unstable dynamite on bad mountain roads and over rotten 
bridges). 
 58. See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1700 (Repl. Vol. 2005); Shippers’ Choice of Va., Inc., 52 
Va. App. at 387 n.3, 660 S.E.2d at 696 n.3; 24 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-121-10 (Cum. Supp. 
2008). 
 59. 274 Va. 541, 545, 650 S.E.2d 527, 530 (2007). 
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permission to develop a residential subdivision, but its applica-
tion was rejected for deficiencies in its plat.60 The town’s ordin-
ance dictated rejection of such an application when the plat exhi-
bited “significant deficiencies,” and the town’s Chief of Current 
Planning explained to Centex that its plat suffered from several 
such, including omission of deed book and tax map references for 
its land parcels and breach of a design standard that called for 
the placement of sewer lines “along rear lot lines rather than 
along the centerlines of public rights of way ‘whenever possi-
ble.’”61  
In response, the developer sued in Loudoun County Circuit 
Court for a writ of mandamus ordering town officials to accept its 
application and for a declaratory judgment that Centex had a 
right to the processing of its application in advance of a decision 
by the planning commission.62 Before the circuit court, Centex 
argued that while it would be entitled by law to judicial review in 
the event of an adverse decision by the planning commission,63 it 
was without adequate remedy for the antecedent refusal of local 
officials to even accept its application in the first place.64 The cir-
cuit court agreed and issued the writ without ruling on the re-
quest by Centex for a declaratory judgment in the alternative.65 
Judge Chamblin agreed with Centex that the developer had no 
remedy for any error of law or fact in the threshold judgment by 
the town rejecting Centex’s application.66 Having delegated to its 
planning commission the power to judge subdivision applications, 
the town nevertheless retained unreviewable discretion to keep 
any application from reaching the commission on grounds of “sig-
nificant” deficiencies.67 The several deficiencies found in this case 
illustrate the range of judgments left in the sole discretion of 
town officials, including the judgment that omission from the plat 
of tax map references was not trivial but significant, and that it 
 
 60. Id. at 544, 650 S.E.2d at 529. 
 61. See id.  
 62. Id. 
 63. See id. at 545, 650 S.E.2d at 529–30 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2260(E) (Repl. 
Vol. 2008)). 
 64. Id. at 545, 650 S.E.2d at 530. 
 65. Id.  
 66. See id., 650 S.E.2d at 531. 
 67. See id. at 547, 650 S.E.2d at 531. 
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was possible to put sewer lines along rear lots where the develop-
er thought it impossible.68 
The Supreme Court of Virginia unanimously reversed.69 In an 
opinion by Senior Justice Russell, the court held that the writ of 
mandamus should not have issued in this case because it called 
for obedience by town officers entitled by law to exercise their 
discretion when rejecting subdivision applications and because an 
action for declaratory judgment offered Centex an adequate re-
medy in the alternative.70 Respecting the nature of the duties in-
volved, Justice Russell wrote that “the decision to be made by the 
Town’s officials . . . involved considerable investigation of the 
submitted plans, the conditions existing on the subject land and 
in the surrounding area, and the exercise of discretion and judg-
ment in applying the applicable statutes, ordinances and regula-
tions to the conditions found to exist.”71 
Respecting a declaratory judgment, Justice Russell wrote for 
the court that this case is just what Virginia Code section 8.01-
191 was designed for—that is, a controversy “over legal rights, 
without requiring one party to invade the asserted rights of 
another.”72 
It would be nice to know that a developer in Centex’s position 
could resort to a declaratory judgment action. But this was a case 
in which the developer disputed the lawfulness of a decision that 
required the town’s decider to answer, as the Supreme Court of 
Virginia acknowledged, “a mixed question of law and fact.”73 The 
supreme court long ago concluded that the Declaratory Judgment 
Act was not intended for judicial correction of an agency’s appli-
cation of law to fact.74 Admittedly, it was not an agency decision 
for which the judicial review provisions of the APA supplied a cir-
cuit court with review jurisdiction; by its own terms, the APA ap-
 
 68. Id. at 544, 650 S.E.2d at 529. 
 69. Id. at 548, 650 S.E.2d at 531. 
 70. See id. at 547–48, 650 S.E.2d at 531. 
 71. Id. at 546, 650 S.E.2d at 530. But see Prince William County v. Hylton Enters., 
216 Va. 582, 584, 221 S.E.2d 534, 536 (1976) (agreeing that mandamus would lie to com-
pel action on development applications by local officials within specified times and that 
mandamus will lie against an inactive officer to tell that officer when to decide, but it will 
not lie to tell that officer how to decide). 
 72. Umstattd, 274 Va. at 548, 650 S.E.2d at 531. See infra Part III.C.2. for a discus-
sion of Miller v. Highland County. 
 73. See Umstattd, 274 Va. at 546, 650 S.E.2d at 530. 
 74. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bishop, 211 Va. 414, 421, 177 S.E.2d 519, 524 (1970).  
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plies only to the decisions of state agencies, not to those of coun-
ties.75 On the other hand, it was a decision about land use, and 
Virginia’s statute on that subject explicitly provides for review of 
such decisions in a board of zoning appeal.76 
What the court said here about the inappositeness of the writ 
of mandamus is patently the law of the case, but what the court 
said about the appositeness of a declaratory judgment is not. It is 
obiter dictum, and dubious at that. 
2.  If Not a Writ of Mandamus, Why Not? 
In Miller v. Highland County, the Supreme Court of Virginia 
held that a third party cannot challenge a conditional use permit 
(“CUP”) in a bill of complaint for a declaratory judgment.77 The 
controversy arose when Highland New Wind Development LLC 
(“New Wind”) applied for a CUP to erect wind turbines and build 
an electrical generation substation on land zoned A-2.78 The tur-
bines would have stood taller than the zoning ordinance allowed 
for A-2 structures, so the board of supervisors amended the or-
dinance to authorize CUP for taller structures.79 Then, after 
making a finding that it was in substantial accord with the com-
prehensive plan, the board issued New Wind its CUP.80 Belated-
ly, New Wind got the planning commission to review the CUP for 
substantial accord, as was required by the state land use law.81 
Property owners, including Miller and Brody, sued for declaratory 
judgments in Highland County Circuit Court.82  
 
 75. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-4001 to -4002 (Repl. Vol. 2008) (defining “agency” as 
“unit of the state government but excluding ‘counties, and all local, regional or multijuris-
dictional authorities created under this Code’”); see also County of Roanoke v. Friendship 
Manor Apartment Village Corp., No. 0394-85, 1985 WL 304641, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Sept. 
4, 1985) (unpublished decision). 
 76. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2311(A) (Repl. Vol. 2008). In turn, decisions of the board of 
zoning appeals are subject to review by writ of certiorari in the circuit courts. Id. § 15.2-
2314 (Repl. Vol. 2008); James W. Farrell, Virginia CLE: Land Use Law in Virginia I-62 to 
I-63 (2002). 
 77. 274 Va. 355, 371, 650 S.E.2d 532, 539–40 (2007). 
 78. Id. at 361, 650 S.E.2d at 533. 
 79. Id., 650 S.E.2d at 533–34. 
 80. Id., 650 S.E.2d at 534. 
 81. Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2232 (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
 82. In Miller’s bill of complaint, the county, but not the board of supervisors, was 
named as a defendant. Miller, 274 Va. at 362, 650 S.E.2d at 534. Conceding that generally 
a county may be sued in connection with its duties, the court nevertheless held that the 
board itself must be named as a defendant in an action based on Virginia Code section 
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In the circuit court, Judge Sheridan granted partial summary 
judgment for defendants New Wind and Highland County after 
concluding that the substantial-accord judgment rendered by the 
zoning commission post hoc did not impair the permit.83 After a 
bench trial, the circuit court found the decision to issue the per-
mit “fairly debatable” and therefore entered judgment for the de-
fendants.84 
The Supreme Court of Virginia unanimously reversed the deci-
sion below in Miller’s case and ordered its dismissal because the 
bill of complaint had named the county rather than its board of 
supervisors, as required by statute in such an action.85 At the 
same time, the court affirmed the decision below in Brody’s case, 
in which the board had been named correctly as defendant.86 For 
reasons of its own—that is, because the land use law allows only 
the applicant to appeal from a planning commission decision in 
such a case87—the court approved of the circuit court’s summary 
judgment for New Wind and Highland County.88 In the view of 
the court, the Declaratory Judgment Act did not so entitle a third 
party.89 Justice Keenan wrote for the court, reminding us gener-
ally that the declaratory judgment statute does not create or alter 
substantive rights; in particular, it does not create a right to ap-
peal where one does not otherwise exist.90 
3.  Where Can a Judge Get a Little Due Process? 
Come we now to Judicial Inquiry & Review Commission v. 
Shull, in which the Supreme Court of Virginia found itself with-
out jurisdiction to hear a judge complain that the Judicial Inquiry 
and Review Commission (the “Commission”) had denied him due 
 
15.2-1404, such as this, and that the fault could not be treated as a misnomer under sec-
tion 8.01-6 because the fault was not simply misnaming the right entity, but rather suing 
the wrong one. Id. at 364, 650 S.E.2d at 535–36. The board was named as a defendant in 
Brody’s bill of complaint. See id. at 372, 650 S.E.2d at 540. 
 83. Id. at 362, 650 S.E.2d at 534. 
 84. Id. at 363, 650 S.E.2d at 534. 
 85. Id. at 367–68, 650 S.E.2d at 537. 
 86. Id. at 372, 650 S.E.2d at 540. 
 87. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2232(B) (Repl. Vol. 2008).  
 88. Miller, 274 Va. at 372–73, 650 S.E.2d at 540. 
 89. Id. at 372, 650 S.E.2d at 540. 
 90. Id. at 370, 372, 650 S.E.2d at 539–40 (citing Shilling v. Jimenez, 268 Va. 202, 204, 
597 S.E.2d 206, 207 (2004) (holding that neighbors could not attack a decision approving a 
subdivision)). 
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process of law by refusing to allow him to confront and cross-
examine his accusers in a hearing on whether his suspension 
from office should continue pending the completion of the Com-
mission’s investigation.91 
Article VI, section 10 of the Constitution of Virginia calls for 
the General Assembly to create a Judicial Inquiry and Review 
Commission to investigate charges that would warrant the re-
tirement, censure, or removal of a judge and authorizes the 
Commission to conduct hearings and subpoena witnesses and 
documents.92 When the Commission finds charges of misconduct 
to be well-founded, the same section authorizes the Commission 
to file a formal complaint before the Supreme Court of Virginia.93 
The court is then obliged to conduct a hearing of its own and to 
censure or remove a judge if the court determines that “the judge 
has engaged in misconduct while in office, or that he has persis-
tently failed to perform the duties of his office, or that he has en-
gaged in conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of jus-
tice.”94 Not surprisingly, the Constitution of Virginia says 
nothing about what manner of hearing shall be provided by ei-
ther the Commission or the court.95 
This case arose when the Commission suspended, with pay,96 a 
judge of the juvenile and domestic relations court after it was re-
ported that he had directed a woman seeking extension of a pro-
tective order to drop her pants and display the leg wound that 
she claimed was the work of her former husband.97 During the 
 
 91. Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm’n v. Shull, 274 Va. 657, 667, 651 S.E.2d 648, 656 
(2007). For more on the regulation of judicial conduct in Virginia, the Judicial Inquiry and 
Review Commission, and the Shull case, see Jeffrey D. McMahan, Jr., Comment, Guard-
ing the Guardians: Judges’ Rights and Virginia’s Judicial Inquiry and Review Commis-
sion, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 473 (2008). 
 92. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. The Constitution of Virginia also authorizes the Commission to investigate 
claims that a judge is disabled, and when it determines them to be well-founded, to alert 
the Supreme Court of Virginia. Id. If, after a hearing of its own, the court finds disability 
likely to be permanent and to seriously interfere with the judge’s performance, then the 
court must order the judge’s retirement. Id.  
 95. Except that the former may be confidential as the General Assembly may provide, 
but the latter must be open to the public. Id. The General Assembly has made the record 
of Commission proceedings confidential unless or until it is forwarded to the Supreme 
Court of Virginia in conjunction with a formal complaint by the Commission. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 17.1-913 (Cum. Supp. 2008). 
 96. See VA. CODE ANN. §17.1-911 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2008). 
 97. Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm’n v. Shull, 274 Va. 657, 662, 651 S.E.2d 648, 651 
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same hearing, ex parte, the judge telephoned the emergency room 
where the woman claimed to have been treated.98 He then re-
fused to extend the protective order while she found a lawyer.99 
In a separate case, the judge offered to settle holiday visitation by 
tossing a coin.100  
To contest his suspension, the judge obtained a hearing before 
the Commission,101 at which he produced witnesses, arguing that 
the Commission bore the burdens of proof and persuasion on the 
statutory standard for continuing his suspension (i.e., that justice 
would be served), and sought to confront and cross-examine his 
accusers.102 At that point, the Commission had not laid a formal 
charge, but it refused to present its complaining witnesses.103 At 
the conclusion of the hearing, the Commission continued his sus-
pension.104  
A month later, the Commission issued three formal charges 
that described violations of judicial canons 1, 2, and 3.105 In re-
sponse, the judge denied ordering the woman to drop her pants, 
maintaining that she had volunteered, but admitted both the ex 
parte phone call and the coin tosses.106 After a formal hearing at 
which the judge appeared and offered testimony from witnesses 
of his own, the Commission found the charges well-founded and 
filed a formal complaint with the Supreme Court of Virginia.107 
Before the supreme court, the judge renewed his due process 
claims.108 After an independent review of the Commission’s 
record, the court found clear and convincing evidence of miscon-
duct and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of jus-
tice,109 and removed the judge from office.110 
 
(2007). 
 98. Id. at 663, 651 S.E.2d at 651. 
 99. Id. at 662, 651 S.E.2d at 651. 
 100. Id. at 663, 651 S.E.2d at 652. 
 101. See VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-911(B) (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2008). 
 102. Shull, 274 Va. at 661–62, 651 S.E.2d at 651. 
 103. See id. at 662 & n.2, 651 S.E.2d at 651 & n.2. 
 104. Id. at 663, 651 S.E.2d at 651. 
 105. Id. at 668–69, 651 S.E.2d at 654–55. 
 106. Id. at 672, 651 S.E.2d at 657. 
 107. Id. at 661, 651 S.E.2d at 650. 
 108. Id. at 671, 651 S.E.2d at 656. He also argued that the Commission violated due 
process by assigning him the burden of proving that continuing his suspension was un-
warranted, and challenged the complaint on its merits, without success. Id. 
 109. See VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10. 
JONES 431 10/29/2008 9:25 AM 
2008] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 89 
With respect to Shull’s due process claims, the court unanim-
ously held that because its only jurisdiction in the matter was 
original (pursuant to Virginia Code section 17.1-906), it was 
without authority to consider such objections.111 If the judge was 
otherwise without a forum for real claims of constitutional di-
mension, such a curt conclusion might deserve more attention. 
According to the court, it is obliged in such cases to look for “clear 
and convincing” evidence in support of the Commission’s 
charges.112 At least where the weight of evidence turns on the 
credibility of a source, it should not be regarded as convincing if 
an opponent was refused any opportunity to confront and cross- 
examine the witness supplying it. But the judge’s claims here are 
not real, and even if they were, a circuit court offers them an ade-
quate forum. 
We hardly need reminding that a constitutional right to due 
process limits the discretion of a state agency when it would dis-
miss an employee from a position that employee holds by te-
nure,113 and that this right entitles the employee to a hearing 
with procedural safeguards adequate to ensure the employee is 
heard in a meaningful way.114 But the judge in this case was 
 
 110. Shull, 274 Va. at 677, 651 S.E.2d at 660. 
 111. Id. at 671–72, 651 S.E.2d at 656–57; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-906 (Repl. Vol. 
2003 & Cum. Supp. 2008). 
 112. Shull, 274 Va. at 670, 651 S.E.2d at 656 (citing Judicial Inquiry & Review 
Comm’n v. Peatross, 269 Va. 428, 444, 611 S.E.2d 392, 400 (2005)). 
 113. 16D C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1900 (2005); 4C MICHIE’S JURISPRUDENCE Consti-
tutional Law § 134 (Repl. Vol. 2006 & Supp. 2007). 
 114. 16D C.J.S. § 1897 (2005). Notwithstanding the black-letter nature of much of 
C.J.S., it errs when it avers that in a disciplinary hearing of which removal may be the 
outcome, a public employee is entitled by due process to cross-examine adverse witnesses. 
Twenty co-authors apparently succumbed to the fallacy of the negative pregnant. In three 
of the four cases on which they rely, courts said only that hearings in which public em-
ployees were allowed cross-examination satisfied due process. These cases therefore did 
not present the question of whether a hearing in which cross-examination was refused sa-
tisfied due process nevertheless. But see McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314, 325 (4th Cir. 
1973). That the due process clause does not generally make cross-examination an essen-
tial procedure in a termination hearing should have been clear since Mathews v. Eldredge, 
424 U.S. 319 (1976). After Mathews, it depends on the nature of the disputed fact as well 
as a balancing between the party’s interest at risk in the hearing and, among other things, 
any risk of witness intimidation. In Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975), a physician 
argued that his state license had been revoked after a hearing that denied him due 
process. Justice White wrote for a unanimous Court approvingly, albeit in obiter dicta, of a 
process substantially similar to that employed in this case. Id. at 55 n.20. See generally 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 7.4.2 (3d ed. 
2006); RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 9.3 (4th ed. 2002); 
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 3 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 17.94-5 
(3d ed. 1999). 
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complaining of a hearing from which followed the decision to con-
tinue his suspension with pay.115 Suspension with pay does not 
usually hazard any interest of constitutional dimension.116 For 
the judge to establish a due process right to cross-examination in 
his suspension hearing, he would have to persuade something 
more.117 A judge’s right to judge, that is, to hear and decide cases, 
should not be added to the collection of rights treated by courts as 
forms of liberty or property for which due process is guaranteed. 
While it is often said that there no longer exists the distinction 
between rights and privileges that once limited judicial enforce-
ment of the due process guarantees,118 the situation of judges fac-
ing discipline ought to persuade that such reports, like some of 
the demise of Mark Twain, are exaggerated.119 
That the Supreme Court of Virginia had no jurisdiction in a 
proceeding pursuant to Virginia Code section 17.1-911 to consider 
claims of due process violations by the Commission does not 
mean that the Commission need not answer in any court for dis-
regarding due process. In another case in which removal may be 
 
 115. Shull, 274 Va. at 663, 651 S.E.2d at 651. 
 116. See In re Davis, 189 S.W.3d 444, 446 (Ark. 2004); see also Fields v. Durham, 909 
F.2d 94, 98 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Royster v. Bd. of Trustees, 774 F.2d 618, 621 (4th Cir. 
1985)); Scruggs v. Keen, 900 F. Supp. 821, 825 (W.D. Va. 1995). In In re Jaffe, the court 
held that a judge’s suspension without pay did not violate due process for want of any 
hearing beforehand. 814 A.2d 308, 316 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Discipline 2003). 
 117. In due course, the Commission in this case afforded the judge a hearing on the 
charges themselves. Shull, 274 Va. at 662, 651 S.E.2d at 651. Curiously, when a judge is 
accused of disability, the statute guarantees that judge the right to call witnesses in the 
hearing conducted by the Commission, but the statute does not explicitly afford the same 
guarantee to a judge accused of misconduct. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-912 (Repl. Vol. 2003). 
Rules of the Commission governing its hearings on charges (versus suspensions) refer to 
them as “formal hearing[s,]” speak of witnesses, and allow for subpoenas, but they do not 
explicitly promise a judge the opportunity for cross-examination. See 15 VA. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 10-10-10 (Cum. Supp. 2008), available at http://www.courts.state.va.us/jirc/rules.html. 
In this case, it appears from the record that the judge did not demand cross-examination 
during the formal hearing; indeed, he seems to have conceded the facts for which the tes-
timony of witnesses would have been relevant. See Shull, 274 Va. at 664–68, 651 S.E.2d at 
652–54. Moreover, from the record one can conclude that the summary of the Commis-
sion’s case with which the judge was earlier supplied left him sufficiently informed to call 
the Commission’s informants as his own witnesses in the formal hearing. See Richardson 
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 404–05 (1971) (holding that a party who did not subpoena cannot 
then complain that a summary of the evidence constituted hearsay and denied that party 
the opportunity to cross-examine the physician who prepared it). 
 118. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 114, at 558–59; PIERCE, supra note 114, at § 
9.3; ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 114, at § 17.2(a). 
 119. “The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated.” Cable from Mark Twain [Sa-
muel Langhorne Clemens] to the Associated Press (1897), in BARTLETT, supra note 4, at 
625. 
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at risk, should the Commission refuse a judge the right to con-
front a Commission informant in its formal hearing, and the evi-
dence be such that its weight could vary according to what oc-
curred during cross-examination, a plausible due process claim 
might well be made out. But in what court? Some court can sure-
ly hear the judge’s complaints about constitutional wrongs by the 
Commission. Although the General Assembly is not obliged to 
provide for judicial review of procedural decisions by the Com-
mission, nevertheless it has, in the APA, where it has promised 
that “[a]ny . . . party aggrieved by and claiming unlawfulness of a 
case decision . . . shall have a right to the direct review thereof by 
an appropriate and timely court action against the agency or its 
officers or agents.”120 
But the APA does not explicitly include the Commission; nor, 
for that matter, does the APA explicitly exclude it.121 Of course, 
in the APA, “‘[a]gency’ means any authority, instrumentality, of-
ficer, board or other unit of the state government empowered by 
the basic laws to make regulations or decide cases.”122 So what 
might put the matter in doubt is firstly whether the Commission 
decides cases. On the one hand, its decision is final when it de-
termines that a complaint of judicial misconduct or disability is 
not well-founded; that decision effectively puts an end to the mat-
ter.123 On the other hand, its decision that a complaint is well-
 
 120. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4026 (Repl. Vol. 2008).  
Actions may be instituted in any court of competent jurisdiction . . . , and the 
judgments  of  the  courts  of  original  jurisdiction  shall  be  subject to appeal 
to or review  by  higher  courts  as in other cases unless otherwise provided 
by law. . . by the court as a defense to the action, and the judgment or decree 
therein shall be appealable as in other cases. 
Id. In a case like this, venue lies in the City of Richmond, where the Commission 
maintains its principal office, or as the parties may otherwise agree. Id. § 2.2-4003 
(Repl. Vol. 2008). 
 121. The APA does exempt “[a]gency action relating . . . to the selection, tenure, dis-
missal, direction or control of any officer or employee of an agency of the Commonwealth.” 
Id. § 2.2-4002(B)(7) (Repl. Vol. 2008). This seems to fall short of action by the Commission 
relating to the tenure or dismissal of a judge. After all, the APA regards courts as organi-
zations different from agencies. See supra text accompanying note 75. Thus, the APA does 
not exclude the Commission from the class of agencies it governs; nor does the APA ex-
empt determinations that complaints of misconduct (or disability) are well-founded. It is 
true that the APA exempts from Article V any “case in which the agency is acting as an 
agent for a court, or . . . encompasses matters subject by law to a trial de novo in any 
court,” VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4025 (Repl. Vol. 2008), but in light of the constitution and the 
statute, it can hardly be argued that the Commission acts for a court when it goes about 
its business. 
 122. Id. § 2.2-4001 (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
 123. Cf. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10 (stating that the Commission must investigate and 
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founded does not end the case, but simply affords the Commission 
an opportunity to make a complaint to the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia if the Commission chooses.124 That the Commission finally 
disposes of some complaints ought to be enough to qualify the 
Commission as a decider in APA terms. Moreover, the Commis-
sion’s decision to suspend pending its investigation should itself 
be seen as deciding. 
Now, do those decisions resolve cases of the sort qualifying the 
deciding body for status as an agency in APA terms? In the APA, 
“case” means: 
[A]ny . . . proceeding or determination that, under laws or regula-
tions at the time, a named party as a matter of past or present fact, 
or of threatened or contemplated private action, either is, is not, or 
may or may not be (i) in violation of such law or regulation or (ii) in 
compliance with any existing requirement for obtaining or retaining 
a license or other right or benefit.125 
Assuming the Commission decides, does it decide cases? It cer-
tainly conducts investigations to which specific judges are parties 
by name. Complaints within its purview may refer to violations of 
law, but they may otherwise refer to “conduct prejudicial to the 
proper administration of justice.”126 Are the judicial canons law? 
Are they regulations? According to the APA, “‘regulation’ means 
any statement of general application, having the force of law, af-
fecting the rights or conduct of any person, adopted by an agency 
in accordance with the authority conferred on it by applicable ba-
sic laws.”127 
The APA appears to regard courts as something other than 
agencies: 
“Agency action” means either an agency’s regulation or case decision 
or both, any violation, compliance, or noncompliance with which 
could be a basis for the imposition of injunctive orders, penal or civil 
sanctions of any kind, or the grant or denial of relief or of a license, 
right, or benefit by any agency or court.128 
 
find the charges to be well-founded to continue a judicial inquiry proceeding). 
 124. Id. 
 125. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4001 (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
 126. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10. 
 127. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4001 (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
 128. Id. (emphasis added) 
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If courts are not agencies, then at least some investigations by 
the Commission are not “cases.” However, investigations of un-
lawful conduct are cases, and that should be enough to make the 
Commission an agency within the meaning of the APA. Thus, for 
purposes of the APA, the Commission is an agency that decides 
cases, so those decisions are reviewable by a circuit court. 
In Judicial Inquiry & Review Commission v. Shull, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia took a complaint by the Commission and 
refused to hear from the judge that the Commission had denied 
him due process.129 The court might have viewed his claims as re-
levant to the weight of the Commission’s evidence, but did not.130 
Because the judge could not show injury to a constitutionally cog-
nizable interest, his claims of constitutional error were spe-
cious,131 so this is not the case that proves the Commission need 
not answer for procedurally shortchanging a disciplined judge. A 
judge removed or suspended without pay after action by the 
Commission contrary to due process may be heard in a circuit 
court on that complaint and therefore, if not immediately in the 
supreme court, then eventually. 
IV.  LEGISLATIVE CHANGES TO VIRGINIA’S FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION ACT 
Virginia’s Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), enacted by the 
General Assembly in 1968, begins from the general principle that 
all public records should be open to citizen inspection and all 
meetings of public bodies should be open to the public.132 FOIA is 
 
 129. Shull, 274 Va. at 671, 651 S.E.2d at 656. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. VA. CODE ANN. §2.2-3700(B) (Repl. Vol. 2008) (“The affairs of government are not 
intended to be conducted in an atmosphere of secrecy since at all times the public is to be 
the beneficiary of any action taken at any level of government.”); see VA. MUN. LEAGUE, 
VA. FREEDOM OF INFO. ACT & THE VA. CONFLICT OF INTEREST ACT 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.vml.org/CLAY/SeriesPDF/06–07FOIACOIARpt1.pdf [hereinafter VA. MUN. 
LEAGUE] (“The guiding principle of FOIA is openness.”); see also Karen E. Jones, Com-
ment, The Effect of the Homeland Security Act on Online Privacy and the Freedom of In-
formation Act, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 787, 788 (2003) (“[T]he government cannot veil all of its 
activities in secrecy or gather information for itself and subsequently shield it from the 
public. A government that is derived from the people must also be accountable to its 
people . . . . As James Madison so eloquently stated, ‘A popular government, without popu-
lar information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or, 
perhaps, both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; and a people who mean to be 
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the embodiment of the understanding between citizens and gov-
ernment that “an open government is the preferred govern-
ment.”133 Emphasizing the commonwealth’s “commitment to 
open government principles,”134 in each year since FOIA’s pas-
sage the legislature has reexamined numerous provisions and re-
vised the statute to address constantly changing public con-
cerns.135 The General Assembly had active sessions in both 2007 
and 2008; in 2007, the legislature passed nineteen bills amending 
the Act,136 and in 2008, twenty-one bills amending the Act.137 
This legislative activity resulted in ten new records exemptions 
and four closed-meeting exemptions, as well as several additional 
amendments to existing provisions of FOIA.138 
A.  FOIA in the Information Age 
Measures permitting citizens access to government records and 
information were enacted at a time when government records ex-
isted only in paper form.139 During the 1950s and 1960s, when 
such statutes were first enacted, the primary methods of commu-
nication were easily categorized as meetings or non-meetings, 
and states envisioned that this classification would create little 
controversy.140 Today, however, most records exist in “paperless” 
 
their own governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.’”) (cit-
ing Letter from James Madison to W.T. Berry (Aug. 4, 1822)).  
 133. Maria J.K. Everett, Op.-Ed., Striking Public-Private Balance Is a Challenge, RICH. 
TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 16, 2008, at E1. 
 134. VA. FREEDOM OF INFO. ADVISORY COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE VA. FREEDOM OF INFO. 
ADVISORY COUNCIL TO THE GOVERNOR & THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VA. 7 (2007), availa-
ble at http://dls.state.va.us/groups/foiacouncil/2007ar.pdf [hereinafter 2007 REPORT]. 
 135. VA. MUN. LEAGUE, supra note 132, at 3. 
 136. 2007 REPORT, supra note 134, at 7. 
 137. See VA. FREEDOM OF INFO. ADVISORY COUNCIL, 2008 FOIA LEGISLATIVE UPDATE 1 
(2008), available at http://dls.state.va.us/groups/foiacouncil/2008updt.pdf [hereinafter 
2008 REPORT]. 
 138. See id.; 2007 REPORT, supra note 134, at 8. 
 139. ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT IN THE COMPUTER AGE: AN EXAMINATION OF STATE 
PUBLIC RECORDS LAWS 2 (Martha Harrell Chumbler, ed., Am. Bar Ass’n 2007) [hereinaf-
ter ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT]; cf. Lauren Bemis, Comment, Balancing a Citizen’s Right to 
Know with the Privacy of an Innocent Family: The Expansion of the Scope of Exemption 
7(C) of The Freedom of Information Act Under National Archives & Records Administra-
tion v. Favish, 25 J. NAT’L ASSOC. ADMIN. L. JUDGES 507, 542 (2005) (explaining that the 
federal FOIA statute was enacted at a time when Congress could not anticipate how ra-
pidly information would be disseminated via television, satellite radio, the Internet, or cell 
phones, and therefore, Congress could not adequately safeguard individuals’ privacy). 
 140. John F. O’Connor & Michael J. Baratz, Some Assembly Required: The Application 
of State Open Meeting Laws to E-mail Correspondence, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 719, 728–
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form, and the government “depend[s] heavily upon information 
technology” to conduct its business.141 
This “information technology” has significantly impacted state 
open meeting statutes. New computer technologies such as e-
mail, instant messaging, text messaging, electronic discussion 
boards, and video conferencing have blurred the distinctions be-
tween “meeting” and “non-meeting.”142 The advent of these new 
technologies has left Virginia, like its sister states, at a cross-
roads: the legislature must somehow incorporate computer tech-
nologies into open meeting laws that were written well before the 
technologies were created.143 
The rush of technological innovations prompted varied res-
ponses by states.144 States define “meetings” in three ways gen-
erally: some use qualifying terms to indicate that not all commu-
nications amongst public officials constitute a meeting; other 
states maintain over-inclusive definitions of meetings that en-
compass all informal communications amongst public officials; 
and others do not define the term at all.145 Only twenty-three 
states specifically address electronic meetings in their FOIA sta-
tutes.146 
 
29 (2004). 
 141. ACCESS TO GOV’T, supra note 139, at 2. 
 142. See Sandra F. Chance & Christina Locke, The Government-in-the-Sunshine Law 
Then and Now: A Model for Implementing New Technologies Consistent with Florida’s Po-
sition as a Leader in Open Government, 35 FL. ST. L. REV. 245, 260 (2008) (examining the 
impact of e-mail, text messaging, and other technology on Florida’s sunshine law). 
 143. See id. at 259. 
 144. See O’Connor & Baratz, supra note 140, at 725. 
 145. Id. at 725–28. 
 146. Chance & Locke, supra note 142, at 260 & n.137. The states that address electron-
ic meetings in their FOIA statutes are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vir-
ginia, and West Virginia. See ALA. CODE § 36-25A-1 (LexisNexis Cum. Supp. 2007); 
ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310(a) (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-431(4) (Cum. Supp. 2007); 
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54952.2(b) (West Cum. Supp. 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-
402(2)(1)(b)(d)(III) (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-200(2) (West 2007); HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 92-3.5 (Cum. Supp. 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 21.8 (West Cum. Supp. 2008); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 75-4314317a (1997 & Cum. Supp. 2007); MO. ANN. STAT. § 610.010(5) (West 
2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-202 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1411 (Supp. 2007); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 10:4-8(b) (West 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-20 (Repl. 
Vol. 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 306 (West 2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.670 (2008); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-46-5(b) (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-20(d) (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 8-44-108 (Supp. 2007); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.127 (Vernon 2004 & Cum. Supp. 
2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 52-4-207 (Repl. Vol. 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3708 (Repl. Vol. 
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Although Virginia’s FOIA statute in its original form did not 
anticipate the birth of, and therefore supply guidance for, the dig-
ital age of government work accomplished by e-mail and data 
stored on computers,147 because of the government’s increasing 
reliance on information technology, Virginia’s legislature has con-
tinued to adapt and revise FOIA accordingly. In fact, Virginia 
now statutorily addresses electronic meetings.148 The General 
Assembly amended FOIA to add a definition of “electronic com-
munications,” which encompass “any audio or combined audio 
and visual communication method.”149 This definition evidences 
the legislature’s recognition that communication amongst mem-
bers of a public body often occurs through telephone, video, or e-
mail, and that in some instances, such communication may con-
stitute a meeting.150 
In only some circumstances, however, does such electronic 
communication constitute a meeting. Virginia falls into the cate-
gory of states that define “meetings”; its definition uses qualify-
ing terms to indicate that not all electronic communications nec-
essarily constitute a meeting.151 In 2004, the Supreme Court of 
Virginia became the first state supreme court to address whether 
e-mail correspondence by members of a public body may consti-
tute a closed meeting forbidden by FOIA.152 In Beck v. Shelton, 
the court found that e-mail communication amongst members of 
a public body does not constitute an electronic meeting subject to 
FOIA.153 
Virginia Code section 2.2-3708 generally forbids public bodies 
from conducting any meetings at which public business is dis-
cussed and the members are not physically assembled.154 This 
 
2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6-9A-2(4) (LexisNexis Repl. Vol. 2006). 
 147. See ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT, supra note 139, at 2; cf. Bemis, supra note 139, at 
542 (discussing a similar scenario with the national FOIA). 
 148. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3708 (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
 149. Id. § 2.2-3701 (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
 150. This manner of communication may sometimes, but does not always, constitute a 
meeting. Compare Roanoke City Sch. Bd. v. Times-World Corp., 226 Va. 185, 307 S.E.2d 
256, 258-59 (Va. 1983) (finding that telephone conferences were not subject to FOIA) with 
Beck v. Shelton, 267 Va. 482; 593 S.E.2d 195 (Va. 2004) (finding that e-mail correspon-
dence did not constitute a meeting subject to FOIA). 
 151. O’Connor & Baratz, supra note 140, at 725–26. 
 152. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3701 (Repl. Vol. 2008); see O’Connor & Baratz, supra note 
140, at 721. 
 153. See Beck v. Shelton, 267 Va. 482, 494, 593 S.E.2d 195, 201 (2004). 
 154. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3708(A) (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
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statutory provision is borne of the notion that “the citizenry must 
be well informed in order to effectively self-govern.”155 The 2007 
revisions, however, amend section 2.2-3708 to allow for meetings 
by electronic communication when the Governor has declared a 
state of emergency, or if the meeting is necessary to take emer-
gency action.156 This amendment thus relaxes the strict prohibi-
tion on meetings without a physically assembled quorum.157 The 
amendments do not significantly alter the general requirement of 
physical assembly, however, because to do so would run counter 
to the General Assembly’s intent that unless an exemption ap-
plies, “every meeting shall be open to the public.”158 
The 2007 and 2008 revisions also relax the notice requirement 
for these types of meetings, permitting public bodies to give only 
three-day notice of an electronic communication meeting, rather 
than the seven days previously required by statute.159 This 
amendment may reflect a degree of practicality. It simply is not 
feasible “for any and all interested members of the public to ‘at-
tend’ an e-mail communication”160 or a telephone conference call. 
Despite this practical concern, the government nevertheless owes 
the public the right to participate in meetings of public bodies in 
which public business is discussed. Three-day notice of a meeting 
to be held by electronic communication “is hardly convenient no-
tice conducive to public participation.”161 
Although there was some relaxation of the requirements sur-
rounding electronic communication meetings, the amendments to 
FOIA’s general notice provisions continue to increase agencies’ 
accountability through compliance with information technology 
standards. The 2007 amendments explicitly require the govern-
ment to post notice of meetings and meeting minutes on the 
 
 155. Chance & Locke, supra note 142, at 245–46. 
 156. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3708(B) (Repl. Vol. 2008). If an authorized state public body 
chooses to hold a meeting via electronic communication, it must also conduct at least one 
meeting annually where all members are physically present and none participates by 
means of electronic communication. Id. 
 157. See VA. FREEDOM OF INFO. ADVISORY COUNCIL, 2007 FOIA LEGISLATIVE UPDATE 3 
(2007), available at http://dls.state.va.us/groups/foiacouncil/2007updt.pdf [hereinafter 
2007 UPDATE]. 
 158. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3700(B) (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
 159. Id. § 2.2-3708(C) (Repl. Vol. 2008); see 2007 UPDATE, supra note 157, at 6. 
 160. O’Connor & Baratz, supra note 140, at 753. 
 161. Charles Bonner, John Paul Jones, & Henry M. Kohnlein, Annual Survey of Virgin-
ia Law: Administrative Procedure, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 727, 737 (1999). 
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Commonwealth Calendar website.162 Posting notice of meetings 
to the Internet is certain to provide access to information and no-
tice of scheduled meetings to many more Virginia citizens than 
would merely posting the printed meeting calendars in a public 
place. Now, anyone with Internet access may visit one website for 
the date, time, and location of any meeting of any public body. In 
offering the calendars of all public bodies in online format, the 
legislature is effectuating its stated goal to “afford every opportu-
nity to citizens to witness the operations of government.”163 
B.  Requests for Public Records 
FOIA dictates that access to government records “shall not be 
denied to citizens of the Commonwealth, representatives of 
newspapers and magazines with circulation in the Common-
wealth, and representatives of radio and television stations 
broadcasting in or into the Commonwealth.”164 The updated 
FOIA reflects only a minor change in the class of people eligible 
to request public records. The 2007 revisions did not expand this 
class of persons granted access to the records of public bodies. In-
stead, the only revision regarding the identity of eligible request-
ers clarifies that FOIA rights are denied to persons civilly com-
mitted pursuant to Virginia’s Sexually Violent Predators Act.165 
The General Assembly could have done more to clarify eligible 
requesters. The statute says nothing of the rights of nonresidents. 
Perhaps the statute simply reflects the fact that “[i]t is generally 
easy for an out of state person or media representative to find a 
Virginia individual to make the request.”166 Public agencies 
would gain nothing by prohibiting requests from foreigners be-
cause Virginia does not condition a FOIA request on a showing 
that the requester has some “civic-minded” purpose.167 Therefore, 
a Virginia resident may make a FOIA request on behalf of a non-
resident. Or, perhaps the statute does not speak to the rights of 
foreign requesters out of concerns about the Due Process Clause 
 
 162. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3707(C), 3707.1 (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
 163. Id. § 2.2-3700(B) (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
 164. Id. § 2.2-3704(A) (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
 165. See id. § 2.2-3703(C) (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
 166. VA. MUN. LEAGUE, supra note 132, at 9. 
 167. See Associated Tax Serv., Inc. v. Fitzpatrick, 236 Va. 181, 187, 372 S.E.2d. 625, 
629 (1988). 
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of the Fourteenth Amendment.168 Regardless, nothing in the sta-
tute forbids a public body from denying a request based on resi-
dency; therefore, it appears that public bodies have the discretion 
to grant or deny requests from non-Virginia residents as they see 
fit. 
The revisions also leave unchanged a provision in the statute 
that permits custodians of records to request—at their discre-
tion—the legal name and address of the requester.169 Should a 
custodian seek this information, a requester may refuse it: noth-
ing in the statute requires the requester to acquiesce.170 Further, 
nothing in the statute offers custodians any recourse should the 
requester fail to provide a legal name and address. If the custo-
dian may request identification, may the custodian also refuse 
the FOIA request should the requester fail to provide a legal 
name and address?171 
Perhaps the decision not to set more standards in this area re-
sults from the post-September 11th realization that the same sta-
tutes providing Virginia’s citizens access to government informa-
tion afford terrorists identical access.172 The manner in which a 
requester uses public records acquired through FOIA requests is 
not governed by FOIA, though; “[t]here are other laws for 
that.”173 Worry over the intent behind a request cannot be used 
to revoke public access to those records;174 nor should the gov-
ernment be permitted to chill requests by screening a requester’s 
legal name and address.175 
Significant changes occurred with respect to responses to in-
formation requests. The recent amendments to Virginia Code sec-
 
 168. Bonner et al., supra note 161, at 730–31; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 169. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3704(A) (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
 170. See VA. MUN. LEAGUE, supra note 132, at 9. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. at 7 (discussing a revision to Virginia Code section 2.2-3711(A)(20) allow-
ing a closed meeting to discuss both planning for terrorist activity and responding to ter-
rorist activity); see also Keith Anderson, Note, Is There Still a “Sound Legal Basis?”: The 
Freedom of Information Act in the Post-9/11 World, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1605, 1649 (2003) 
(arguing that although terrorist organizations may not obtain all of their information 
through the federal FOIA, the executive branch of the federal government is justified in 
limiting information that might be used for destructive purposes by terrorist groups). 
 173. Everett, supra note 133. 
 174. See id. 
 175. Cf. Taylor v. Worrell Enters., Inc., 242 Va. 219, 222, 409 S.E.2d. 136, 138 (1991) 
(stating that compelled release of the Governor of Virginia’s telephone logs could have a 
chilling effect on the Governor’s use of the telephone for commonwealth business). 
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tion 2.2-3704 clarify that all responses must be in writing.176 Not 
only must the response from the public body be in writing, but it 
must be in one of the four statutorily provided forms.177 In Fenter 
v. Norfolk Airport Authority, the Supreme Court of Virginia de-
termined that the Norfolk Airport Authority (the “Airport Au-
thority”) violated FOIA when it failed to adequately respond to 
John Fenter’s requests for information about the authority of the 
Airport Authority to randomly search vehicles entering the air-
port.178 The Airport Authority responded by letter to all of Fen-
ter’s written requests for information; however, the Authority’s 
replies indicated only that it had contacted a second agency for 
advice or had referred the matter to its legal counsel.179 The 
court found those responses did not meet the requirements of the 
Virginia Code.180 Thus, in each response to a FOIA request, an 
agency must clearly respond through one of the four statutorily 
created responses.181 
The four responses permitted by statute were amended by the 
General Assembly in 2007: the revisions eliminate the possibility 
that an agency might respond to a request merely by notifying 
the requestor that the records will be provided.182 Now, when a 
public body receives a FOIA request but cannot find the re-
quested records, and the agency knows that another public body 
maintains those records, it must provide that agency’s contact in-
formation to the requester.183 Today, the Airport Authority’s re-
sponse to Fenter indicating it had contacted another agency 
would still be inadequate—it ought to have informed him how to 
contact the agency the Authority believed was in possession of 
the sought-after information. Requiring a requested agency to 
identify the custodial agency precludes a public body from fru-
strating a requester by merely replying that it cannot find the 
records or that it does not have them. 
 
 176. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3704(B)(1–4) (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
 177. See id. 
 178. See Fenter v. Norfolk Airport Auth., 274 Va. 524, 528–32, 649 S.E.2d 704, 706–09 
(2007). 
 179. Id. at 531, 649 S.E.2d at 708. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3704(B) (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
 182. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3704(B) (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
 183. See id. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3704(B)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
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C.  Closed Meetings 
In 2007, the General Assembly added four closed meeting ex-
emptions, most of which correspond to records exemptions. There 
is now an exemption for meetings relating to records exempted 
from the Virginia Retirement System or local retirement sys-
tems.184 The 2008 amendments added exemptions for (1) meet-
ings relating to the Virginia Military Advisory Council, the Vir-
ginia National Defense Industrial Authority, or a local or regional 
military affairs organization appointed by a local governing 
body;185 (2) discussion or consideration by the Virginia Board of 
Education of records related to the denial, suspension, or revoca-
tion of teacher licenses;186 and (3) discussion or consideration of 
confidential or proprietary records provided by a private business 
to certain state, local, or regional industrial or economic develop-
ment authorities or organizations for business, trade, or tourism 
development.187 
D.  Enforcement 
FOIA enforcement remains mostly unchanged. Virginia Code 
section 3713 was amended to clarify that enforcement of viola-
tions of FOIA by public bodies is to be adjudicated in the general 
district court or circuit court of the residence of the aggrieved 
party, or, in the alternative, in the City of Richmond.188 
E.  Records Exemptions 
The General Assembly enacted FOIA “to ensure public access 
to governmental records and meetings, to avoid an ‘atmosphere of 
secrecy’ in the conduct of government affairs, and to encourage 
resolution of disputes in these areas through agreement rather 
 
 184. Act of Mar. 21, 2007, ch. 739, 2007 Va. Acts 1119 (codified as amended at VA. 
CODE ANN. § 2.2-3711(A)(20) (Repl. Vol. 2008)). 
 185. Act of Mar. 27, 2008, ch. 721, 2008 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 2.2-3711(A)(42) (Repl. Vol. 2008)). 
 186. Act of Mar. 27, 2008, ch. 668, 2008 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 2.2-3711(A)(41) (Repl. Vol. 2008)). 
 187. Act of Mar. 12, 2008, ch. 626, 2008 Va. Acts __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-
3711(A)(40) (Repl. Vol. 2008)). 
 188. VA. CODE ANN. § 3713 (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
JONES 431 10/29/2008 9:25 AM 
102 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:73 
than litigation.”189 A government of the people, by the people, 
and for the people must be accountable to its people.190 But this 
policy is not absolute.191 The General Assembly’s creation of a 
number of exceptions to FOIA evinces the legislative intent that 
this policy of sunshine in government “does not override the need 
for confidentiality in every circumstance”; moreover, often the 
Commonwealth’s best interests may require that some records 
not be disclosed.192 
To proponents of open government, however, “FOIA in Virginia 
is not perfect; there will always be more exceptions to what is 
considered public information that [sic] what is not.”193 After all, 
“FOIA was enacted as a disclosure statute, not as a non-
disclosure statute.”194 The 2007 and 2008 amendments will do 
nothing to ease the concerns of those worried that the statute 
classifies more information than not as FOIA-exempt; the revi-
sions increase the number of exceptions available to public bo-
dies. The 2007 revisions included these new exceptions: the iden-
tities of executioners from FOIA requests;195 certain information 
contained in rabies vaccination certificates is exempt through a 
revision to section 3705.7;196 and some records held by the Vir-
ginia Retirement System.197 
In the 2008 session, the General Assembly passed nine bills 
creating seven new records exemptions.198 Now exempt from 
FOIA are certain records of the Virginia Military Advisory Coun-
 
 189. Taylor v. Worrell Enters., Inc., 242 Va. 219, 224, 409 S.E.2d. 136, 139 (1991); see 
Jones, supra note 132, at 788 (“[T]he government cannot veil all of its activities in secrecy 
or gather information for itself and subsequently shield it from the public.”). 
 190. Jones, supra note 132, at 788. 
 191. See Taylor, 242 Va. at 224, 409 S.E.2d at 139. 
 192. Id.; see also Anderson, supra note 172, at 1608 (stating that the need for open gov-
ernment must be balanced with the need for the government to be able to withhold infor-
mation it deems essential to the protection of the public). 
 193. Editorial, Not Much Sunshine, THE DAILY NEWS LEADER (Staunton, Va.), July 21, 
2007, at 7A. 
 194. Bemis, supra note 139, at 543. 
 195. Act of Mar. 21, 2007, ch. 737, 2007 Va. Acts 1116 (codified as amended at VA. 
CODE ANN. § 2.2-3705.7(26) (Repl. Vol. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-233 (Cum. Supp. 
2008)). 
 196. This provision was removed during the 2008 session. See Act of Feb. 22, 2008, ch. 
16, 2008 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3705.7 (Repl. Vol. 
2008)).  
 197. Act of Mar. 21, 2007, ch. 739, 2007 Va. Acts 1119 (codified as amended at VA. 
CODE ANN. § 2.2-3705.7(25) (Repl. Vol. 2008)); see 2000 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 215.  
 198. See 2008 REPORT, supra note 137, at 1. 
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cil, the Virginia National Defense Industrial Authority, or a local 
or regional military affairs organization;199 certain confidential 
documents provided by an insurance carrier to the Virginia 
Health Commissioner;200 “[i]nvestigator notes, and other corres-
pondence and information . . . with respect to an active investiga-
tion conducted by or for the [Virginia] Board of Education related 
to the denial, suspension, or revocation of teacher licenses;”201 
“[r]ecords maintained by the Department of the Treasury or par-
ticipants in the Local Government Investment Pool, to the extent 
that such records relate to information required to be provided by 
such participants to the Department to establish accounts;”202 
records “supplied by a private or nongovernmental entity to the 
Inspector General of the Virginia Department of Transportation 
for the purpose of an audit, special investigation, or any study re-
quested by the Inspector General’s Office;”203 and certain records 
of the Office of the Attorney General acting pursuant to its en-
forcement authority under the Master Settlement Agreement re-
garding certain tobacco product manufacturers, to the extent that 
those records contain information submitted by a private busi-
ness entity or principal thereof to the Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral.204 
The most controversial of these bills exempts the donor records 
of institutions of higher education.205 This bill, requested by the 
University of Virginia (“UVA”), protects the anonymity of donors 
who do not want their personal information publicized.206 Sup-
porters and critics alike agree that UVA should have the right to 
withhold donors’ social security numbers, financial information, 
 
 199. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3705.2(12) (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
 200. Id. § 2.2-3705.6(21) (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
 201. Id. § 2.2-3705.3(13) (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
 202. Id. § 2.2-3705.7(27) (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
 203. Id. § 2.2-3705.6(22) (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
 204. See id. § 2.2-3705.3(14) (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
 205. See Act of Mar. 27, 2008, ch. 665, 2008 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA. 
CODE ANN. § 2.2-3705.4(7) (Repl. Vol. 2008)); see also Tyler Whitley, New Law Allows Ano-
nymity for Donors to Some Schools, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 21, 2008, at B3; Brian 
McNeill, U.Va Seeks To Withhold Donor Data, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 15, 2008, at 
B1; Editorial, Sunshine, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 17, 2008, at A12. 
 206. Editorial, supra note 205. The bill would exempt from FOIA a significant portion 
of UVA’s fundraising database; the university would be required only to provide a donor’s 
name, the size and date of a contribution, and for what purpose the donation was desig-
nated. McNeill, supra note 205. 
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marital status, and other personal data.207 But critics argue that 
university donations, and the donors themselves, “have political 
and policy implications,”208 and therefore the names of donors 
ought to be subject to FOIA.209 As a public institution, UVA is 
subject to FOIA; thus its finances and funders “must be transpa-
rent to ensure accountability.”210 Closure of a university’s records 
may indicate to other institutions that they, too, may close their 
records when closure benefits their needs.211 This subverts the 
policy of open government. 
Similarly controversial is the proposed exemption for concealed 
weapon permit holders. The Virginia Freedom of Information Ad-
visory Council appointed two subcommittees to examine the most 
controversial issues discussed in the 2008 legislative session: 
electronic meetings and access to personal information.212 The 
proposed exemption for concealed weapon permit holders was 
sent to the privacy advisory committee appointed by the Virginia 
Freedom of Information Advisory Council for further study and 
promises heated debate in the 2009 legislative session. As one ob-
server noted, “[w]ith the exception of abortion, perhaps no other 
issue in current American debate invokes more emotionally 
charged rhetoric and diametric opposition than the proper place 
of firearms in the modern-day United States.”213  
In previous years, the privacy of an individual’s name and ad-
dress, or other identifying personal information, was “in a sense 
protected by the barriers of time and inconvenience involved in 
collecting this information from public records.”214 Not so today: 
In March of 2007, the Roanoke Times published a list of all Virgi-
nians with a permit to carry a concealed handgun.215 The list, 
 
 207. Id. 
 208. Editorial, supra note 205. 
 209. See McNeill, supra note 205 (quoting Jennifer Perkins, executive director of the 
Virginia Coalition for Open Government, who says, “‘but what if a reporter is doing a story 
about a public official who hasn’t paid taxes in a dozen years but is giving half a million 
dollars to U.Va? We’d want to know about that.’”). 
 210. Id. 
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maintained by the state police as an investigative tool,216 was 
sent to a Roanoke Times reporter in response to a FOIA request. 
Its subsequent publication sparked public outcry.217 Safety con-
cerns persuaded the removal of the database from the newspa-
per’s website.218 But is the proper answer to public objection or 
safety concerns to restrict public access to those records causing 
concern? 
The General Assembly has yet to resolve the issue. Perhaps 
guidance may be had from other states that have already made 
such a decision. Connecticut, Delaware, Missouri, Utah, and 
Washington, for example, exempt from FOIA all records identify-
ing individuals permitted to carry a concealed weapon.219 Alaska, 
Arizona, Arkansas, Hawaii, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and West 
Virginia prohibit disclosure of the identity of individuals who 
have a permit to carry a concealed weapon to anyone other than 
law enforcement or criminal justice agencies.220 South Carolina, 
however, makes such records available to anyone who requests 
them.221  
Still other states strive to maintain some sort of balance be-
tween total exclusion from FOIA and complete public access. For 
example, in South Dakota, applications for permits to carry con-
cealed weapons must be maintained, and, as such, are public 
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records; however, the information on the applications is confiden-
tial.222 Maine also exempts applications for concealed weapons 
permits from FOIA.223 In Ohio, the sheriff is required to main-
tain such records, which the statute designates as confidential 
and not public.224 Yet, if a journalist makes a request for such 
records, the sheriff is required to disclose the identifying informa-
tion of the person seeking the concealed weapon permit.225 
Also bound to attract notable debate in 2009 will be the status 
of disciplinary information posted to the Virginia State Bar (the 
“Bar”) website. The Bar posts charges of attorney misconduct 
that have received a finding of probable cause of a violation of le-
gal ethics.226 The Supreme Court of Virginia has asked the Bar to 
refrain from posting disciplinary information about a lawyer until 
the time for filing any appeal has expired.227 This poses concern 
for the Bar, however, because the failure to publicize that infor-
mation to the public could mean that an attorney may be under 
suspension while appealing the decision and the public would 
have no way of accessing this information.228 This promises to 
bring interesting debate between the Bar and the supreme court 
in regards to the accessibility of information concerning discipli-
nary proceedings. 
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